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Applying the Rule of Law in the War on
Terror: An Examination of Guantanamo
Bay Through the Lens of the U.S.
Constitution and the Geneva Conventions
By JOHN R. PARISEAULT*
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the
United States, the U.S. government waged a war against terrorism by
invading Afghanistan and pursuing the terrorist network known as Al
Qaeda.1 This "war on terror" is largely focused upon an unknown
and clandestine enemy whose strength is dispersed around the globe.
In order to anticipate future attacks, cripple terrorist organizations,
and punish those who have committed terrorist acts, the United
States must be able to gather intelligence. The naval base at
Guantanamo Bay has become a vital and controversial forum in
which the United States military currently detains and interrogates
Taliban fighters from Afghanistan and those with alleged connections
to Al Qaeda.2
This article will examine the detention of prisoners by the United
States at the naval base on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, through the lens
of the Geneva Conventions3 and the United States Constitution. This
article will considerPresident Bush's November 13, 2001 Executive
J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (Congress authorized
President Bush to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks).
2. CNN.com/U.S., Detainees Treated Humanely, Officials Say, Jan. 23, 2002. at
<http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/21/xray.conditions/> (visited Nov. 29, 2004).
3. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter "Geneva Convention III"]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T
3516 [hereinafter "Geneva Convention II"].
*
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Order' regarding the indefinite detention of non-U.S. citizens,
consider the special need for interrogation and intelligence gathering
presented by this war on terror, and look at mechanisms foreign
governments have used to deal with terrorism. Finally, this article
will propose ways in which the United States can achieve its security
goals while also extending international and Constitutional
protections to its non-citizen prisoners.
BACKGROUND
L The United States is Engaged in an Armed Conflict to Which the
Geneva Conventions Should Apply
The Geneva Conventions "apply to all cases of declared war or
of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of
the High Contracting Parties."5 Even if one party to a conflict is not a
party to the Geneva Convention, the Convention is nevertheless
binding on the power that is a contracting party.6 The United States
is a party to the Convention and must abide by its rules governing the
treatment of captured forces in the event of an armed conflict.
However, it is unclear whether the Taliban or Al Qaeda can be
characterized as "parties, 7 to a conflict as contemplated by the
Geneva Conventions. The United States did not recognize the
Taliban as the controlling party of Afghanistan. 8 Additionally, Al
Qaeda is not a state - it is a group of private actors who do not abide
by the laws of war.9 It is helpful at this point to examine how the
United States is justified in using military force against private actors,
and whether this type of armed conflict invokes the Geneva
Conventions.
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949 makes clear that:
[tihe armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized
4. Exec. Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
5. Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, part I, art. 1
6. Id. at art. 2.
7. Id.
8. John Bowman, The Taliban Afghanistan's Fundamentalist Leaders, CBC
News
Online,
Aug.
10,
2004,
at
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/indepthlbackground/taliban.html> (visited Nov. 29, 2004).
9. Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, part I, art. 3 (terrorist acts violate the
principle that parties to a conflict must not attack civilians who take no active part in
the hostilities).
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armed forces... under a command responsible to that Party...
even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority
not recognized by an adverse party.
The Taliban regime, although largely unrecognized by foreign states,
governed much of Afghanistan." It therefore should qualify as a
"party" under the Geneva Conventions.
Al Qaeda, on the other hand, is a worldwide terrorist network.12
Terrorist acts by private individuals are not generally construed as
acts of war:
War is a condition between states or between a state and an
identifiable force. Because terrorists are not states and generally
refuse to fulfill the requirements for becoming an identifiable
warring party under Geneva Convention III, terrorists, by
definition, are never engaged in a legal act of war under accepted
customary definitions. 3

No evidence has been brought forward to suggest that
As an
Afghanistan or the Taliban controlled Al Qaeda.14
independent and international terrorist organization, Al Qaeda's
actions violate the laws of war as prescribed by the Geneva
Conventions. "5 Terrorist groups commit crimes not legal acts of war,
yet the United States' use of military force against Al Qaeda appears
to be acceptable under international norms.16
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter identifies the right of
self-defense in response to armed attack. 1 Neither the U.N. Charter
10. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, part III, § 2, art.43.
11. Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisonersof
War": The Law and Politicsof Labels, 36 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 59, 81 (2003).
Hunting
Bin
Laden,
at
12. PBS:
Frontline,
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/alqaeda.html>
(visited Mar. 1, 2004) (containing excerpts from U.S.'s 1989 indictment of Osama Bin
Laden: "In approximately 1989, bin Laden and co-defendant Muhammad Atef
founded "Al Qaeda," "an international terrorist group... which was dedicated to
opposing non-Islamic governments with force and violence.").
13. Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 12, at 74.
14. Id. at 75.
15. See infra note 9.
16. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. The United Nations Charter provides that the UN
Security Council "shall" determine if a threat to international peace exists and what
measures are necessary to restore peace. The United States is a member of the
United Nations and would presumably be required to allow the Security Council to
assess the current situation rather than acting unilaterally.
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 51:
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nor international practice "circumscribes the identity of aggressors

against whom states may respond: private actors as well as
governments may be the sources of catastrophic conduct.'.. The
United States has taken aim at Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and anyone

else who commits or conspires to commit terrorist acts against the
country."9 The war on terror finds its justification in the right of a
state to defend itself against armed attack.20 The United States is a
signatory to the Geneva Conventions and should be guided by it in

the exercise of military force against all enemies.
II. Guantanamo Bay Detainees and the Geneva Conventions
If we consider the armed conflict with Afghanistan and other

measures taken around the world to root out terrorism following the
September 11, 2001 attacks to be a war, then how must the United
States characterize its enemy? Most accounts suggest that there are
both alleged Taliban and Al Qaeda members being held at the U.S.
base on Guantanamo Bay. 21 These individuals were captured on the
battlefield in Afghanistan and discovered in other locations around
the world.2 ' Although quick to refer to its use of military force as a
war on terrorism, the Bush administration has been less willing to

classify the Guantanamo detainees23 pursuant to the clear directive of
Geneva Convention 111.24

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in
the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
Id.
18. Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 12, at 76-77.
19. Exec. Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
20. Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 12, at 75-76.
21. Akash R. Desai, How We Should Think about the ConstitutionalStatus of the
Suspected TerroristDetainees at Guantanamo Bay: Examining Theories that Interpret
the Constitution's Scope, 36 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1579 (2003); CNN.com/U.S.,
supra note 3; David Rose, GuantanamoBay on Trial, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2004, at 90.
22. Desai, supra note 22, at 1591.
23. Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 12, at 79.
24. Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, part I, art. 5.
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A. Prisoners of War
Prisoner of war status entitles detainees to important benefits.
First, a prisoner of war must be treated humanely - the detaining
party may not physically or mentally harm or threaten to harm any
prisoner of war. 25 The detaining party must also provide living
conditions and medical care necessary for the life and physical well
being of prisoners of war. 6 When questioned by his captor, a prisoner
of war is bound only to provide his surname, first name and rank,
date of birth, and army serial number.27 No coercion may be used to
gain information from a prisoner of war. Finally, prisoners of war
must be released and returned to their home country when the armed
conflict has ended.29
Geneva Convention III enumerates six categories of persons who
qualify as prisoners of war. The first category includes armed military
personnel of a party to a conflict." The Taliban fighters defended the
de facto government of Afghanistan from U.S. invasion and would
appear to warrant prisoner of war status. The Bush administration
has stated that captured Taliban fighters are covered by the Geneva
Conventions, will be treated humanely, but will not receive prisoner
of war status.
An additional category of persons who qualify as prisoners of
war are members of militias and other warring groups who operate
independently of a government's armed forces.32 These persons may
obtain prisoner of war status so long as they (1) have a chain of
command, (2) wear uniforms or are otherwise identifiable, (3) follow
the laws of war, and (4) carry arms openly.33 Al Qaeda, and terrorist
groups in general, achieve their ends by secrecy and sabotage.
Members of Al Qaeda may have a chain of command, but they do not
wear uniforms, carry arms openly, or follow the rules of war.
25. INTERNATIONAL COMMIqTEE OF THE RED CROSS, Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War: Commentary 152 (Jean de Preux &
Frederic Siordet eds. 1960).
26. Geneva Convention III, supra note 4.
27. Id. at art. 17.
28. Id.
29. Id. at § II, art. 118.
30. Id. at art. 4.
31. White House Fact Sheet, Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html> (visited Mar.
1,2004).
32. Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 4., 6 U.S.T. 3316.
33. Id.
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Therefore, they cannot be classified as prisoners of war pursuant to
Geneva Convention III.
B. Unlawful Combatants
The Bush administration has identified Al Qaeda detainees as

"unlawful combatants," a term that refers to individuals who "directly
join in hostilities outside the limits imposed by the international law
of armed conflict."" Unlawful combatants are persons, such as
civilians and non-combat members of the military, who engage in a

war without35 authorization and do not meet the criteria for prisoner of
war status.

Persons who are not prisoners of war may be detained during
times of armed conflict for reasons of national security pursuant to
Geneva Convention 1.36 A person who does not qualify as a prisoner
of war may be detained within U.S. territory if he or she is definitely
suspected of, or engaged in, activities hostile to the security of the
United States.37 Detention without trial can last until the armed
conflict has ended or earlier, if no longer necessary for security
In addition, such persons are entitled to humane
purposes.
treatment and, "in case of trial shall not be deprived of the rights of
fair and regular trial prescribed" by the Geneva Conventions.39
What is the significance of classifying Al Qaeda as unlawful
combatants as opposed to prisoners of war or simply criminals?
Some commentators suggest that the U.S. government has assigned

this label to bolster its ability to use military commissions to try
members of Al Qaeda.4 President Bush made clear his intention to
detain and try by military tribunal any individual who he determines
has engaged in, aided, or conspired to commit terrorist acts against

34. Thomas J. Lepri, Safeguarding the Enemy Within: The Need for Procedural
Protectionsfor U.S. Citizens Detainedas Enemy Combatants Under Ex Parte Quirin,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2565, 2572 (2003).
35. See Ex parte Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S.,31(1942); CBC News, PoWs and
at
2003),
15,
(Dec.
Combatants
Unlawful
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/genevaconventions.html>.
36. Geneva Convention LI, supra note 4, part I, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
37. Id.; Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of
PersonsDetained Without Trial,44 HARV. INT'L L. J. 503, 512-14 (2003).
38. Geneva Convention II, supra note 4, art. 5-6, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
39. Geneva Convention II, supra note 3, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
40. Michael C. Dorf, What is an Unlawful Combatant and Why it Matters: The
at
Fighters,
Taliban
and
Qaeda
Al
Detained
of
Status
<http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020123.html> (visited Feb. 16, 2003).
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the United States, or anyone who has harbored such individuals."
Labeling Al Qaeda detainees as unlawful combatants makes it
easier for the Bush administration to defend its intention to use nonreviewable military tribunals. In Ex parte Quirin v. Cox, the Supreme
Court distinguished between lawful and unlawful combatants:
Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as
prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants
are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they
are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts
which render their belligerency unlawful ....
[A]n enemy
combatant who without uniform comes secretly through [the
military lines of a belligerent in time of war] for the purpose of
waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples
of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the
status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war
subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals. 2
The Quirin Court denied the argument that a military trial for
offenses against the laws of war was subject to the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments of the Constitution. The Fifth Amendment provides
that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury. ' 4 3 The Sixth Amendment mandates that juries in a civilian court
hear such trials.'
Quirin explained that indictment by a grand jury and trial by jury
were familiar parts of both criminal and civil trials at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution. However, such judicial mechanisms
were not part of military tribunals at that time. Moreover, it was not
the purpose of the Amendments to enlarge the then-existing right to
a jury trial.4 ' Rather, the purpose was:
[T]o preserve unimpaired trial by jury in all those cases in which it
had been recognized by the common law and in all cases of a like
nature as they might arise in the future, but not to bring within the
sweep of the guaranty those cases in which it was then well
understood that a jury trial could not be demanded as of right...
[Slection 2 of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
cannot be taken to have extended the right to demand a jury to
42. Exec. Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, (Nov. 13, 2001).
43. 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
45. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39.
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trials by military commission, or to have required that offenses
against the law of war not triable by jury at common law be tried
only in the civil courts. 46
The Quirin Court refused to extend important constitutional
protections to German soldiers who were deemed unlawful
combatants for allegedly violating the laws of war. Similarly, by
labeling the Guantanamo detainees unlawful combatants the Bush
administration seeks to try them before military commissions, which
function differently than United States federal courts.
Specifically, military tribunals do not require grand jury
indictment or trial by jury. '7 In addition, according to the November
13 Executive Order, the standard for admitting evidence will differ
All evidence that would, in the opinion of the
significantly.'
presiding officer of the military commission, have probative value to a
The proposed military
reasonable person will be admitted.4 9
commissions will also provide the only form of relief available to
detainees. They will not have the opportunity to have their case
reviewed by a U.S. civilian court, a foreign national court, or an
international court."
DISCUSSION

I.

Problems With the November 13 Order
A.

The Geneva Conventions Require a Hearing to Determine if a
Detainee is a Prisonerof War

Article 5 of Geneva Convention III states that all persons who
have committed a belligerent act against the party by whom that
person is being detained will enjoy the protections of the prisoner of
war status as described by the Conventions." If there is any doubt as
46. Id. at 39-40 (citations omitted).
47. Id.
48. Exec. Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
49. 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 at sec. 4 (c)(3).
50. 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 at sec. 7(b)(2). (The President's November 13 Order also
denies detainees tried by military commission the ability to have their case heard by
any other adjudicatory body: "the [detainee] shall not be privileged to seek any
remedy or maintain any proceeding... or to have any such remedy or proceeding
sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State
thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal.").
51. Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3316.
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to whether a detainee falls within the enumerated categories of

prisoner of war status, then that person's status must be determined
by a competent tribunal. 2 Notably, the American military adopted
this international guideline into its own rules of conduct.53
President Bush's blanket determination that neither Al Qaeda

nor Taliban fighters will be considered prisoners of war 4 contravenes
Article 5 of Geneva Convention III as well as American military

regulation. The President is not a tribunal and "cannot substitute for
one under Article 5."55 Additionally, Article 5 of Geneva Convention
III makes clear that detainees are presumed to be prisoners of war

and treated as such until a finding to the contrary is made by a
competent tribunal. 6
In their amicus curiae brief, several retired military officers took
issue with the November 13 Order and the President's blanket denial

of prisoner of war status to detainees at Guantanamo Bay.57 The
amicus brief explained that the policy by which nations treat foreign
prisoners is based on the principle of reciprocity."' Therefore, how

the United States. conducts itself in this conflict will influence how
other nations treat captured American soldiers in the future.
The United States has consistently insisted that foreign countries
apply the basic protections of the Geneva Conventions to captured
American soldiers, even where the Geneva Conventions would not
technically apply. 9 In addition, the United States serves as an
example to the world. Authoritarian regimes are already using the

United States' treatment of the Guantanamo detainees as justification
for indefinitely detaining people in those nations.'
Based on these observations, the retired military officers

52. Id.
53. U. S. Dep't of Army, Regulation 190-8, "Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees," sec. 1-5(a)(2) (Oct. 1, 1997); See
Brief of Amici Curiae Retired Military Officers, Rasul v. Bush, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C.
Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 USLW 3171 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-334).
54. See White House Fact Sheet, supra note 32 (relating the President's
determinations as to the status of Guantanamo detainees).
55. George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal
Combatants,96 AM. J. INT'L L. 891, 897 (2002).
56. Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3316.
57. Brief of Amici Curiae Retired Military Officers, Rasul v. Bush, 321 F.3d 1134
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 USLW 3171 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-334).
58. Id. at 16.
59. Id. at 12-13.
60. Id. at 14.
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concluded that "it is essential that the [U.S.] government follow
American military regulations that incorporate the 'competent
tribunal' guarantee of the Geneva Conventions."6 1 Failure to do so
"may well provide foreign authorities, in current or future conflicts,
with an excuse not to comply with the Geneva Conventions with
respect to captured American military forces." 62
The President's blanket determination that no Guantanamo
detainee qualifies as a prisoner of war contravenes the competent
tribunal guarantee and substitutes the rule of law with independent
As the Bush administration moves
executive decision-making.
further away from the Geneva Conventions and established U.S.
military regulations, the more its conduct will appear to be arbitrary
and capricious. This is especially dangerous, as the amicus brief
notes, in a context of reciprocity because many non-Democratic
regimes notice the United States' actions and will respond
accordingly.
B. There Have Been No Chargesand No Trials: Indefinite
Detention
In his November 13, 2001 Executive Order, President Bush
essentially suspended the writ of habeas corpus. The order precludes
those imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay from challenging the validity of
their detention in U.S. courts. 63 Recently, however, in Rasul v. Bush,
the Supreme Court took on this issue and held that non-citizen
detainees held by the U.S. military on Guantanamo Bay are entitled
to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court to
challenge their detention. 64
A writ of habeas corpus serves to bring a person before a court
of law, most frequently to ensure that the person's imprisonment or
detention is not illegal. 65 The writ of habeas corpus is of immemorial
antiquity in English law,' and the privilege is recognized in Article I,
Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution.67
The Supreme Court's decision in Rasul is a significant step

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 11-12.
Exec. Order66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, sec. 6 (b)(2) (Nov. 13, 2001).
124 S.Ct. 2686,2698 (2004).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 715 (7th ed. 1999).
Id.
U.S. CONST., art.1, § 9.
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towards bringing the U.S.'s effort to combat terrorism within the rule
of law. Nevertheless, important questions remain as to how such how
such trials will be conducted, and what role the judiciary should play
in this war on terror. In pondering these questions it is helpful to
consider the governmental interest served by extended detention of
persons having suspected connections to terrorist activities.
II. Modern Practical Justifications for Indefinite Detention
Without Trial
The November 13 Order, which allows for indefinite detention of
non-citizens who are suspected of being or having connections to
terrorists, states:
The ability of the United States to protect the United States and its
citizens, and to help its allies and other cooperating nations protect
their nations and their citizens, from such further terrorist attacks
depends in significant part upon using the United States Armed
Forces to identify terrorists and those who support them, to disrupt
their activities, and to eliminate their ability to conduct or support
such attacks. 8
Part of this effort includes the gathering of people and
information to gain intelligence. The war on terror is very different
than traditional concepts of war because of the clandestine nature of
the enemy. Terrorists are effective because their plans are secret and
their attacks are surprising. Therefore, the war on terror involves a
great deal of intelligence gathering in order to anticipate attacks and
break down the networks that perpetrate them.
This emphasis on intelligence requires detainment and interrogation
of persons suspected of terrorism or of having knowledge about
terrorists. Michael Koubi, the former chief interrogator for Israel's
General Security Services has extensive experience interrogating
hostile Arab prisoners. The importance that fear of the unknown
plays in interrogation is key because "People are afraid of the
unknown. They are afraid of being tortured, of being held for a long
time.... When the captive believes that anything could happen torture, execution, indefinite imprisonment, even
the persecution of
69
his loved ones - the interrogator can go to work.,
The Bush administration maintains that the detainees will not be
68. Exec. Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, sec. 1 (d)(Nov. 13, 2001).
69. Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Oct. 2003.
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subjected to physical or mental abuse or cruel treatment.7 ° The
International Committee of the Red Cross has visited the prisoners,
will continue to have access to Guantanamo, and will be able to raise
concerns to the U.S. government about the condition of prisoners.7
Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether the U.S. will or has
employed other coercive forms of interrogation, such as isolation,
cooperation-based rewards, sleep deprivation, depriving the prisoner
of outside information, and other methods known as "torture lite.""
Amnesty International has called on the United States to keep
detailed records of any interrogation of a detainee including the
duration, frequency and the identity of those present.73 These records
should be accessible to the detainee and his counsel.74 Prisoners must
be given counsel, they must be informed of their right to lodge
complaints about their treatment, and given the opportunity to
challenge their detention before a competent tribunal.75
.It seems clear that allowing the Guantanamo detainees access to
counsel and the ability to challenge their detention, at least at the
initial stages of their imprisonment, would seriously hinder U.S.
interrogation efforts, by eliminating the detainee's fear of the
unknown.76 In addition, such disclosure by the U.S. government with
regard to the captives would greatly decrease the value of the
intelligence gained. "Once a top-level suspect is publicly known to be
in custody, his intelligence value falls. His organization scatters,
altering its plans, disguises, cover stories, codes, tactics, and
communication methods., 77 Therefore, in order to prevent new
attacks, it may be imperative to keep the capture of certain persons
undisclosed.

70. White House Fact Sheet, supra note 32.
71. Id.
72. Bowden, supra note 71, at 6.
73. Amnesty International News Release, Pakistani Prisoners at Guantanamo
Bay at Risk of Ill-Treatment Amnesty International Seeks Safeguards During
Interrogation
(August
2,
2002),
at
<http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/usa08022002.html>.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Bowden, supra note 7.
77. Id. at 7.
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Ill. Balancing the Needs of the War Effort with the Mandates of the
Geneva Convention and the Protections of the U.S. Constitution
The remainder of this paper is dedicated to discussing how the
U.S. government can continue to gather valuable information and
conduct a war on terror while also abiding by the rule of law as
provided by the Constitution and international standards.
A. Competent Tribunals to Determine Status
The U.S. government should abide by Article 5 of Geneva
Convention III and provide a competent tribunal to determine the
status of the detainees. Doing so will help to ease the impression that
Guantanamo is a rights-free zone. It is significant to note that the
Supreme Court recently held that U.S. citizens who have been
designated "enemy combatants" are entitled to a meaningful
opportunity to challenge the factual basis of their detention before a
neutral decision-maker,78 with the aid of counsel.79 In Hamdi, the
Court was not presented with the question of whether non-citizens
detained at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to the same protections.
However, the Court's decision suggests its disfavor of indefinite
detention.
Some may argue that conducting tribunals and granting prisoner
of war status will preclude interrogation and the gathering of valuable
information. Geneva Convention III provides that "prisoners of war
are obliged to give only their name, rank, serial number and date of
birth."'8 However, nothing in Geneva Convention III prohibits
interrogation on other matters.8' It merely relieves prisoners of war
of the duty to respond. Therefore, "whether or not prisoner of war
status is granted, interrogators still face the formidable task of
encouraging, with limited tools at their disposal, hostile detainees to
Prisoners of war can be interrogated and
provide information."'
pressured; "they just cannot be coerced or tortured." 83
Merely providing a competent tribunal to determine the status of
a detainee will not hinder the effectiveness of interrogations. There is
no requirement that the determination of status must be made public.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004).
Id. at 2652.
Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, part III, sec. I, art. 17.
Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 12, at 89.
Id.
Id.
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Perhaps the International Committee of the Red Cross could play a
part in the competent tribunals by being allowed to observe them and
confirm to the international community that a process for evaluating
the status of the prisoners is in place. The Red Cross could be
prohibited from offering input into the determinations or releasing
information about the captives.
In addition, the Geneva Conventions allow for the continued
captivity of those detainees who are not found to be prisoners of war
if premised on the need for security. 84 The use of competent tribunals
to determine the status of the detainees will not adversely affect the
government's ability to detain and interrogate its prisoners.
However, the presence of an international body would help restore
international and domestic confidence in U.S. policy and conduct.
B.

Habeas Petition:The Opportunity to Challenge One's
Detention

As mentioned above, the Supreme Court recently held that noncitizen detainees held by the U.S. military on Guantanamo Bay are
entitled to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court to
challenge their detention." Prior to this decision, critics argued that
allowing federal courts to hear challenges by Guantanamo Bay
detainees would allow confidential information to enter into the
public domain." Others lamented that "relaxed rules of evidence"
are necessary to the prosecution of international terrorists.' Rules
such as hearsay and authentication would place too high a burden on
the prosecution to develop a record when much information is
classified or unknown. The level of security throughout such a
proceeding to protect the judges and jury would also be very
expensive.' Critics argued that granting habeas jurisdiction to alleged
terrorists would result in the loss of valuable security information and
the release of culpable and dangerous persons due to the unique
nature of terrorist cases and the inadequacies of ordinary courts of
law.
84. Geneva Convention II, supra note 4, part I, art. 5.
85. Rasul,124 S.Ct. at 2698.
86. Harvey Rishikof, Is It Time For a Federal Terrorist Court? Terrorists and
Prosecutions: Problems. Paradigms, and Paradoxes, 8 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 1, 12 (2003).
87. Keith S. Alexander, In the Wake of September 11th: The Use of Military
Tribunals to Try Terrorists,78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 885,914-15 (2003).
88. Rishikof, supra note 88.
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1.

Can FederalCourts Handle Habeas PetitionsFrom Alleged
InternationalTerrorists?

Federal district courts are well equipped to handle terrorist
cases.8 9 Congress "has already addressed the dangers of the release of
national security information in such trials with the enactment of the
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) in 1980." 90 CIPA
provides for the use of such procedures for maintaining security of
information as "non-public hearings, ex parte and in camera reviews,
and redacted evidence. '""
In addition, the Fourth Amendment's' warrant requirement
would not be an impediment to the prosecution's ability to introduce
valuable evidence against alleged terrorists. The Fourth Amendment
requires the procurement of a warrant only for that evidence
obtained in the United States. The Fourth Amendment does not
apply to evidence attained outside of the United States, nor does it
apply to non-government actors (such as reporters) who are not
acting as agents of the government. 93
As to the issue of security, a federal judge can move a trial to a
secure location, even to a military base in a military courtroom, if
presented with a "credible threat" that the current forum is in
The identity of both judge and jurors can also be
danger.
protected.9
History also supports the belief that federal courts are able
conduct trials involving terrorism. Federal courts have heard
important terrorist cases in the past without incident and without
allowing guilty terrorists to go free. For instance, in United States v.
Yousef,96 the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court for the
Southern District of New York's conviction of defendants
Yousef,Ismoil, and Murad on charges of conspiracy to bomb United
States commercial airliners, and on charges relating to the 1993

89. Jonathon Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of
Military Governance in a MadisonianDemocracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 745

(2002).
90. Id. at 746.
91. Id.

92. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
93. Turley, supra note 91, at 747.
94. Id. at 748.
95. Id.
96. 327 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 2003).
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bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. 97 Yousef was
sentenced to 240 years of imprisonment and life imprisonment, to be
served consecutively; Murad, another defendant, was sentenced to
life imprisonment and 60 years of imprisonment, to be served
consecutively; and Ismoil was sentenced to 240 years of
imprisonment. 9
On appeal, the defendants claimed that the District Court erred
in admitting a letter found in Yousef's apartment in Manila, for
failing to redact it, and in not suppressing Murad's confession to FBI
agents during his flight from the Philippines to the United States.99
The Second Circuit upheld the lower court's rulings in admitting the
unredacted letter on the grounds that the risks entailed in admitting
the evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value.'"
The Court of Appeal's standard of review in evaluating the
district court's ruling in a suppression motion is "clearly erroneous."' '
The Court found that the District Court was not clearly erroneous,
given the facts of the case, in admitting the confession.'"
Nevertheless, this article recognizes the substantial differences
between the Yousef case and the September 11, 2001 attacks. The
magnitude of the September 11 attacks and the American
government's significant commitment to uprooting terrorist cells
around the world, present different problems that require a more
streamlined and effective process for finding, questioning, and
punishing terrorists.
The fact that the U.S. is currently engaged in a war on terrorism
raises the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Johnson v.
Eisentrager about the ability of enemy aliens to challenge their
detentions.' °3 The Court warned that such trials would be detrimental
to the U.S. war effort by causing the judiciary to second-guess field
commanders and divert their attention from the battlefield.'0
In proposing a solution to these issues it may be helpful to
consider the experience of the United Kingdom in curbing terrorism
in Northern Ireland.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 77-78, 173.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 120, 122.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 124-27.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950).
Id. at, 779.
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2.

Examining the United Kingdom's Effort to Combat
Terrorism in Northern Ireland

In 1972, Lord Diplock, Chairman of the Commission to consider
legal procedures to address terrorist activities in Northern Ireland,
The
presented his findings and recommendations to Parliament."
scope of the Commission's inquiry was to determine what
"arrangements for the administration of justice" could be made to
deal with terrorism and terrorist organizations in Northern Ireland.""
This article will consider three aspects of the Commission's
recommendations as illustrative of the ways in which a government
can respond to the particular difficulties of trying terrorists.
The Commission explained that ordinary trial by jury was not
practicable in the case of terrorist crimes in Northern Ireland due to
jurors. 10 7
the threat of intimidation by terrorist organizations on
Therefore, to help obtain impartial judgments, the better practice
would be to conduct trials for terrorist offenses before a single judge
who would act as the finder of fact and law.10 8 Nevertheless, the
defendant would retain her right to appeal the judge's decision. And,
the judge would have to deliver a statement of some sort regarding
the issues in the case and describing his determinations. ' °9
Another problem the Commission addressed was the
by terrorist
witnesses
government's
of the
intimidation
1
0
organizations. To help combat this problem of being able to obtain
witnesses, the Commission reconsidered the customary right of the
accused to refuse to provide an explanation of his conduct either at
his trial or before it."'
The Commission recommended that once the prosecution has
proven certain facts capable of implicating the accused in the offence,
the burden would shift to the accused to furnish an explanation of the
facts consistent with his innocence.'12 While preserving the mandate
that the prosecution prove its case, the change would alleviate the
105. CHAIRMAN LORD DIPLOCK, Report to the Commission to Consider Legal
Procedures to Deal with Terrorist activities in Northern Ireland, Great Britain,
(London Dec. 1972).
106. Id. at 1.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 18.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 25.
111. Id. at 25.
112. Id.
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prosecution's difficult task of proving the defendant's intent or
knowledge without the ability to draw on credible witnesses."3'
For example, if a firearm or explosive were found on a particular
premises, the presumption would be that the occupier or any person
residing at the premises was in possession of the firearm, unless he
could prove that he did not know and had no reason to know that the
firearm was there. 4 If the court was satisfied after the accused's
testimony and cross-examination, that it was more likely to be true
than not, then the accused would be acquitted."5
The proposed changes for terrorist trials would also weaken the
rules relating to the admissibility of confessions.'16 The Commission
explained that the emphasis should be on whether the "confession is
reliable evidence of the guilt of the accused" rather than on technical
rules of "voluntariness," which rendered inadmissible any statement
made by the accused after his arrest unless he volunteered it without
any persuasion or encouragement."7 The technical rules made futile
the efforts of law enforcement to interrogate suspected terrorists
because the information they gleaned was inadmissible. 8 The new
rule would make inculpatory admissions admissible subject to the
condition that the trier of fact consider whether the alleged admission
was in fact made, and if so, whether the circumstances suggest that
the accused may have inculpated himself falsely." 9
While the problems presented to the United States in trying
terrorists may not be identical to those presented in the context of
Northern Ireland, the example may be helpful in crafting special U.S.
terrorist court procedure.
IV. Specialized Federal District Courts on Terrorism
Specialized, Congressionally-authorized terrorism courts may be
the best solution to the issues raised in this article. Congressional
authorization would avoid the separation of powers criticism
garnered by military commissions. 2 ' They could also handle the
113. Id.
114. Id. at 27.
115. Id. at 27-28.
116. Id. at 28.
117. Id. at 29.
118. Id. at 31.
119. Id. at 32.
120. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 337 (2002).
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peculiar needs of the government in its war on terror, such as
allowing for mandatory detention periods, and evidentiary rules that
take into account the security and availability constraints on the
prosecution in making its case. Such variations would garner greater
acceptance because they would be a product of a working democratic
system as opposed to independent Executive decision-making.
This article recognizes that deference ought to be given to the
Executive branch in times of crisis. However, Congress should, as
part of its oversight authority, promulgate a framework for the
detention and trial of suspected terrorists.12' Vesting sole authority in
the Executive to define who the terrorists are, how they should be
detained, and in what way they should be tried, contravenes the
intention of the framers of our Constitution in establishing a tripartite
separation of powers and a truly independent judiciary. 122 The history
and development of American law is clearly focused upon protecting
individual liberties and subjecting
the Executive branch and the
123
law.
of
rule
the
to
Legislature
What Would a Federal Terrorism Court Look Like?
1. Mandatory Detention Periodfor InterrogationPurposes (Need
to fit in with other headings in article;I cannot find what
HICLR style is on this so I'm following the other headings in
this article.)
In order to facilitate the government's interest in gaining
information from suspected terrorists, it may be necessary to restrict
the availability of habeas relief until the detainee has been held for a
certain period of time to be determined by Congress. Experts could
estimate how long effective interrogation should last. They might
also be able to tell us how long a person must be detained and
questioned before it can be determined that he possesses no
information related to terrorism. The military should be able to use
these time periods with flexibility - depending on the particular
detainee. If the government has gained information from a particular
121. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in
Petitioners, at 22.
122. Brief of 175 Members of Both Houses of the Parliament of
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in
Petitioners at 16, Rasul v. Bush, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.
USLW 3171 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-334).
123. Id. at 17.
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detainee then it may be justified to hold that prisoner for a longer
period of time without judicial review.
2. Security
As suggested above, a federal judge could move a trial to a
military facility if she believed that there was a threat to the security
of the current trial. Terrorist trials should be held at secure locations
to avoid the possibility that they will become the targets of additional
terrorist attacks and also to ensure the safety of the persons on trial.
Perhaps having a federal court hear habeas petitions right at the naval
base on Guantanamo Bay would lower the expense of transporting
the prisoners and also guarantee the safety of those involved in the
trial.
3. Evidence
The focus of the rules of evidence in a terrorism court should be
on reliability. They should be aimed at making the country less
'
vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and on capturing the right people. 24
The standards of admissibility can be different from the Federal
Rules of Evidence so long as the new rules are consistent and reliable.
In Northern Ireland, because prosecutors had difficulty obtaining
witnesses willing to testify, the modified rules shifted the burden to
the defendant to explain why he was not culpable once the
prosecution brought a certain amount of evidence against him." This
approach might be useful in hearing habeas petitions from
Guantanamo detainees because the prosecution will often have
limited access to secure information.
In addition, confessions and third party information regarding an
alleged terrorist should be admissible if it passes a reliability test. In
Northern Ireland, the rule was that confessions made after being
arrested were admissible if the judge was satisfied that the alleged
admission was in fact made, and the circumstances suggested that the
accused had not inculpated himself falsely. 2 6 A similar standard may
be appropriate for prosecuting the Guantanamo detainees.
Whatever rules and procedures Congress decides upon for
detaining and trying terrorists, they must be applied consistently. By
124. Interview with Richard Boswell, Professor at the University of California,
Hastings College of the Law, in San Francisco, Cal. (Feb. 17, 2004).
125. CHAIRMAN LORD DIPLOCK, supra note 107, at 26.
126. Id.
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creating and authorizing a terrorism court, the United States will be
applying the rule of law over what now appears to be independent
and arbitrary conduct by the Executive branch.
CONCLUSION
This article has criticized the U.S. government for its indefinite
detention of individuals without a competent tribunal to determine
their status under the Geneva Convention III.
Allowing the
Executive branch to lock people up for an unknown amount of time,
no matter where they are located, while insisting that the judiciary
cannot restrain such power, contravenes constitutional values of
personal liberty, due process, and separation of power. Nevertheless,
this article recognizes that terrorists are dangerous people who must
be found, interrogated, and punished. The Supreme Court's decision
that prisoners at Guantanamo Bay are entitled to file a habeas
petition in federal court is an important step in getting the United
States to operate within the rule of law. In addition to habeas
protections, this article proposes that the Congress create a terrorism
court and establish procedures applicable to dealing with the problem
of terrorism, in order to achieve a balance between the needs of the
military in fighting the war on terror, and the need to uphold personal
liberty and the rule of law.
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